Approximation Algorithms for Computing Maximin Share Allocations by Amanatidis, Georgios et al.
Approximation Algorithms for Computing Maximin
Share Allocations*
Georgios Amanatidis† Evangelos Markakis† Afshin Nikzad‡ Amin Saberi‡
June 12, 2018
Abstract
We study the problem of computing maximin share allocations, a recently introduced
fairness notion. Given a set of n agents and a set of goods, the maximin share of an agent is
the best she can guarantee to herself, if she is allowed to partition the goods in any way
she prefers, into n bundles, and then receive her least desirable bundle. The objective
then is to find a partition, where each agent is guaranteed her maximin share. Such al-
locations do not always exist, hence we resort to approximation algorithms. Our main re-
sult is a 2/3-approximation, that runs in polynomial time for any number of agents and
goods. This improves upon the algorithm of Procaccia and Wang [2014], which is also
a 2/3-approximation but runs in polynomial time only for a constant number of agents.
To achieve this, we redesign certain parts of the algorithm in Procaccia and Wang [2014],
exploiting the construction of carefully selected matchings in a bipartite graph represen-
tation of the problem. Furthermore, motivated by the apparent difficulty in establishing
lower bounds, we undertake a probabilistic analysis. We prove that in randomly generated
instances, maximin share allocations exist with high probability. This can be seen as a jus-
tification of previously reported experimental evidence. Finally, we provide further positive
results for two special cases arising from previous works. The first is the intriguing case of
3 agents, where we provide an improved 7/8-approximation. The second case is when all
item values belong to {0,1,2}, where we obtain an exact algorithm.
1 Introduction
We study a recently proposed fair division problem in the context of allocating indivisible goods.
Fair division has attracted the attention of various scientific disciplines, including among oth-
ers, mathematics, economics, and political science. Ever since the first attempt for a formal
treatment by Steinhaus, Banach, and Knaster [Steinhaus, 1948], many interesting and chal-
lenging questions have emerged. Over the past decades, a vast literature has developed, see
e.g., [Brams and Taylor, 1996, Robertson and Webb, 1998], and several notions of fairness have
been suggested. The area gradually gained popularity in computer science as well, as most of
the questions are inherently algorithmic, see [Even and Paz, 1984, Edmonds and Pruhs, 2006,
Woeginger and Sgall, 2007], among others, for earlier works and the surveys by Procaccia [2015]
and by Bouveret et al. [2016] on more recent results.
The objective in fair division problems is to allocate a set of resources to a set of n agents
in a way that leaves every agent satisfied. In the continuous case, the available resources are
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typically represented by the interval [0, 1], whereas in the discrete case, we have a set of dis-
tinct, indivisible goods. The preferences of each agent are represented by a valuation function,
which is usually an additive function (additive on the set of goods in the discrete case, or a
probability distribution on [0,1] in the continuous case). Given such a setup, many solution
concepts have been proposed as to what constitutes a fair solution. Some of the standard ones
include proportionality, envy-freeness, equitability and several variants of them. The most re-
lated concept to our work is proportionality, where an allocation is called proportional, if each
agent receives a bundle of goods that is worth at least 1/n of the total value according to her
valuation function.
Interestingly, all the above mentioned solutions and several others can be attained in the
continuous case. Apart from mere existence, in some cases we can also have efficient algo-
rithms, see e.g., [Even and Paz, 1984] for proportionality and [Aziz and MacKenzie, 2016] for
some recent progress on envy-freeness. In the presence of indivisible goods however, the pic-
ture is quite different. We cannot guarantee existence and it is even NP-hard to decide whether
a given instance admits fair allocations. In fact, in most cases it is hard to produce decent ap-
proximation guarantees.
Motivated by the question of what can we guarantee in the discrete case, we focus on a con-
cept recently introduced by Budish [2011], that can be seen as a relaxation of proportionality.
The rationale is as follows: suppose that an agent, say agent i , is asked to partition the goods
into n bundles and then the rest of the agents choose a bundle before i . In the worst case,
agent i will be left with her least valuable bundle. Hence, a risk-averse agent would choose a
partition that maximizes the minimum value of a bundle in the partition. This value is called
the maximin share of agent i . The objective then is to find an allocation where every agent
receives at least her maximin share. Even for this notion, existence is not guaranteed under
indivisible goods [Procaccia and Wang, 2014, Kurokawa et al., 2016], despite the encouraging
experimental evidence [Bouveret and Lemaître, 2016, Procaccia and Wang, 2014]. However, it
is possible to have constant factor approximations, as has been recently shown [Procaccia and
Wang, 2014] (see also our related work section).
Contribution: Our main result, in Section 4, is a (2/3− ε)-approximation algorithm, for any
constant ε > 0, that runs in polynomial time for any number of agents and any number of
goods. That is, the algorithm produces an allocation where every agent receives a bundle worth
at least 2/3−ε of her maximin share. Our result improves upon the 2/3-approximation of Pro-
caccia and Wang [2014], which runs in polynomial time only for a constant number of agents.
To achieve this, we redesign certain parts of their algorithm, arguing about the existence of ap-
propriate, carefully constructed matchings in a bipartite graph representation of the problem.
Before that, in Section 3, we provide a much simpler and faster 1/2-approximation algorithm.
Despite the worse factor, this algorithm still has its own merit due to its simplicity.
Moreover, we study two special cases, motivated by previous works. The first one is the
case of n = 3 agents. This is an interesting turning point on the approximability of the problem;
for n = 2, there always exist maximin share allocations, but adding a third agent makes the
problem significantly more complex, and the best known ratio was 3/4 [Procaccia and Wang,
2014]. We provide an algorithm with an approximation guarantee of 7/8, by examining more
deeply the set of allowed matchings that we can use to satisfy the agents. The second case
is the setting where all item values belong to {0,1,2}. This is an extension of the {0,1} setting
studied by Bouveret and Lemaître [2016] and we show that there always exists a maximin share
allocation, for any number of agents.
Finally, motivated by the apparent difficulty in finding impossibility results on the approx-
imability of the problem, we undertake a probabilistic analysis in Section 6. Our analysis shows
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that in randomly generated instances, maximin share allocations exist with high probabil-
ity. This may be seen as a justification of the reported experimental evidence [Bouveret and
Lemaître, 2016, Procaccia and Wang, 2014], which show that maximin share allocations exist in
most cases.
Related Work: For an overview of the classic fairness notions and related results, we refer the
reader to the books of Brams and Taylor [1996], and Robertson and Webb [1998]. The notion we
study here was introduced by Budish [2011] for ordinal utilities (i.e., agents have rankings over
alternatives), building on concepts by Moulin [1990]. Later on, Bouveret and Lemaître [2016]
defined the notion for cardinal utilities, in the form that we study it here, and provided many
important insights as well as experimental evidence. The first constant factor approximation
algorithm was given by Procaccia and Wang [2014], achieving a 2/3-approximation but in time
exponential in the number of agents.
On the negative side, constructions of instances where no maximin share allocation exists,
even for n = 3, have been provided both by Procaccia and Wang [2014], and by Kurokawa et al.
[2016]. These elaborate constructions, along with the extensive experimentation of Bouveret
and Lemaître [2016], reveal that it has been challenging to produce better lower bounds, i.e.,
instances where noα-approximation of a maximin share allocation exists, even forα very close
to 1. Driven by these observations, a probabilistic analysis, similar in spirit but more general
than ours, is carried out by Kurokawa et al. [2016]. In our analysis in Section 6, all values are
uniformly drawn from [0,1]; Kurokawa et al. [2016] show a similar result with ours but for a a
wide range of distributions over [0,1], establishing that maximin share allocations exist with
high probability under all such distributions. However, their analysis, general as it may be,
needs very large values of n to guarantee relatively high probability, hence it does not fully
justify the experimental results discussed above.
Recently, some variants of the problem have also been considered. Barman and Murthy
[2017] gave a constant factor approximation of 1/10 for the case where the agents have sub-
modular valuation functions. It remains an interesting open problem to determine whether
better factors are achievable for submodular, or other non-additive functions. Along a different
direction, Caragiannis et al. [2016] introduced the notion of pairwise maximin share guarantee
and provided approximation algorithms. Although conceptually this is not too far apart from
maximin shares, the two notions are incomparable.
Another aspect that has been studied is the design of truthful mechanisms providing ap-
proximate maximin share fairness guarantees. Note that our work here does not deal with in-
centive issues. Looking at this as a mechanism design problem without money, Amanatidis
et al. [2016] provide both positive and negative results exhibiting a clear separation between
what can be achieved with and without the truthfulness constraint. Even further, Amanatidis
et al. [2017] completely characterized truthful mechanisms for two agents, which in turn im-
plied tight bounds on the approximability of maximin share fairness by truthful mechanisms.
Finally, a seemingly related problem is that of max-min fairness (also known as the Santa
Claus problem) [Asadpour and Saberi, 2007, Bansal and Sviridenko, 2006, Bezakova and Dani,
2005]. In this problem we want to find an allocation where the value of the least happy person
is maximized. With identical agents, this coincides with our problem, but beyond this special
case the two problems exhibit very different behavior.
2 Definitions and Notation
For any k ∈N, we denote by [k] the set {1, . . . ,k}. Let N = [n] be a set of n agents and M = [m]
be a set of indivisible items. Following the usual setup in the fair division literature, we assume
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each agent has an additive valuation function vi (·), so that for every S ⊆M , vi (S)=∑ j∈S vi ({ j }).
For j ∈M , we will use vi j instead of vi ({ j }).
Given any subset S ⊆ M , an allocation of S to the n agents is a partition T = (T1, ...,Tn),
where Ti ∩T j =; and⋃Ti = S. LetΠn(S) be the set of all partitions of a set S into n bundles.
Definition 2.1. Given a set of n agents, and any set S ⊆ M, the n-maximin share of an agent i
with respect to S, is:
µi (n,S)= maxT∈Πn (S) minT j∈T vi (T j ) .
Note that µi (n,S) depends on the valuation function vi (·) but is independent of any other
function v j (·) for j 6= i . When S =M , we refer to µi (n, M) as the maximin share of agent i . The
solution concept we study asks for a partition that gives each agent her maximin share.
Definition 2.2. Given a set of agents N , and a set of goods M, a partition T = (T1, ...,Tn) ∈Πn(M)
is called a maximin share (MMS) allocation if vi (Ti )≥µi (n, M) , for every agent i ∈N .
Before we continue, a few words are in order regarding the appeal of this new concept. First
of all, it is very easy to see that having a maximin share guarantee to every agent forms a relax-
ation of proportionality, see Claim 3.1. Given the known impossibility results for proportional
allocations under indivisible items, it is worth investigating whether such relaxations are easier
to attain. Second, the maximin share guarantee has an intuitive interpretation; for an agent i ,
it is the value that could be achieved if we run the generalization of the cut-and-choose proto-
col for multiple agents, with i being the cutter. In other words, it is the value that agent i can
guarantee to himself, if he were given the advantage to control the partition of the items into
bundles, but not the allocation of the bundles to the agents.
Example 1. Consider an instance with three agents and five items:
a b c d e
Agent 1 1/2 1/2 1/3 1/3 1/3
Agent 2 1/2 1/4 1/4 1/4 0
Agent 3 1/2 1/2 1 1/2 1/2
If M = {a,b,c,d ,e} is the set of items, one can see that µ1(3, M)= 1/2, µ2(3, M)= 1/4, µ3(3, M)=
1. E.g., for agent 1, no matter how she partitions the items into three bundles, the worst bundle
will be worth at most 1/2 for her, and she achieves this with the partition ({a}, {b,c}, {d ,e}). Sim-
ilarly, agent 3 can guarantee a value of 1 (which is best possible as it is equal to v3(M)/n) by the
partition ({a,b}, {c}, {d ,e}).
Note that this instance admits a maximin share allocation, e.g., ({a}, {b,c}, {d ,e}), and in fact
this is not unique. Note also that if we remove some agent, say agent 2, the maximin values for the
other two agents increase. E.g., µ1(2, M)= 1, achieved by the partition ({a,b}, {c,d ,e}). Similarly,
µ3(2, M)= 3/2.
As shown in [Procaccia and Wang, 2014], maximin share allocations do not always exist.
Hence, our focus is on approximation algorithms, i.e., on algorithms that produce a partition
where each agent i receives a bundle worth (according to vi ) at least ρ·µi (n, M), for some ρ ≤ 1.
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3 Warmup: Some Useful Properties and a Polynomial Time 1/2-
approximation
We find it instructive to provide first a simpler and faster algorithm that achieves a worse ap-
proximation of 1/2. In the course of obtaining this algorithm, we also identify some important
properties and insights that we will use in the next sections.
We start with an upper bound on our solution for each agent. The maximin share guarantee
is a relaxation of proportionality, so we trivially have:
Claim 3.1. For every i ∈N and every S ⊆M, µi (n,S)≤
vi (S)
n
=
∑
j∈S vi j
n
.
Proof. This follows by the definition of maximin share. If there existed a partition where the
minimum value for agent i exceeded the above bound, then the total value for agent i would
be more than
∑
j∈S vi j .
Based on this, we now show how to get an additive approximation. Algorithm 1 below
achieves an additive approximation of vmax , where vmax =maxi , j vi j . This simple algorithm,
which we will refer to as the Greedy Round-Robin Algorithm, has also been discussed by Bou-
veret and Lemaître [2016], where it was shown that when all item values are in {0,1}, it produces
an exact maximin share allocation. At the same time, we note that the algorithm also achieves
envy-freeness up to one item, another solution concept defined by Budish [2011], and further
discussed in Caragiannis et al. [2016]. Finally, some variations of this algorithm have also been
used in other allocation problems, see e.g., Brams and King [2005], or the protocol in Bouveret
and Lang [2011]. We discuss further the properties of Greedy Round-Robin in Section 6.
In the statement of the algorithm below, the set VN is the set of valuation functions VN =
{vi : i ∈N }, which can be encoded as a valuation matrix since the functions are additive.
ALGORITHM 1: Greedy Round-Robin(N , M ,VN )
1 Set Si =; for each i ∈N .
2 Fix an ordering of the agents arbitrarily.
3 while ∃ unallocated items do
4 Si = Si ∪ { j }, where i is the next agent to be examined in the current round (proceeding in a
round-robin fashion) and j is i ’s most desired item among the currently unallocated items.
5 return (S1, ...,Sn)
Theorem 3.2. If (S1, ...,Sn) is the output of Algorithm 1, then for every i ∈N ,
vi (Si )≥
∑
j∈M vi j
n
− vmax ≥µi (n, M)− vmax .
Proof. Let (S1, ...,Sn) be the output of Algorithm 1. We first prove the following claim about the
envy of each agent towards the rest of the agents:
Claim 3.3. For every i , j ∈N , vi (Si )≥ vi (S j )− vmax .
Proof. Fix an agent i , and let j 6= i . We will upper bound the difference vi (S j )− vi (Si ). If j
comes after i in the order chosen by the algorithm, then the statement of the claim trivially
holds, since i always picks an item at least as desirable as the one j picks. Suppose that j
precedes i in the ordering. The algorithm proceeds in ` = dm/ne rounds. In each round k, let
rk and r
′
k be the items allocated to j and i respectively. Then
vi (S j )− vi (Si )= (vi ,r1 − vi ,r ′1 )+ (vi ,r2 − vi ,r ′2 )+·· ·+ (vi ,r` − vi ,r ′`) .
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Note that there may be no item r ′
`
in the last round if the algorithm runs out of goods but this
does not affect the analysis (simply set vi ,r ′
`
= 0).
Since agent i picks her most desirable item when it is her turn to choose, this means that
for two consecutive rounds k and k+1 it holds that vi ,r ′k ≥ vi ,rk+1 . This directly implies that
vi (S j )− vi (Si )≤ vi ,r1 − vi ,r ′` ≤ vi ,r1 ≤ vmax .  
If we now sum up the statement of Claim 3.3 for each j , we get: nvi (Si )≥∑ j vi (S j )−nvmax ,
which implies
vi (Si )≥
∑
j vi (S j )
n
− vmax =
∑
j∈M vi j
n
− vmax ≥µi (n, M)− vmax ,
where the last inequality holds by Claim 3.1.
The next important ingredient is the following monotonicity property, which says that we
can allocate a single good to an agent without decreasing the maximin share of other agents.
Note that this lemma also follows from Lemma 1 of Bouveret and Lemaître [2016], yet, for com-
pleteness, we prove it here as well.
Lemma 3.4 (Monotonicity property). For any agent i and any good j , it holds that
µi (n−1, M { j })≥µi (n, M) .
Proof. Let us look at agent i , and consider a partition of M that attains her maximin share. Let
(S1, ...,Sn) be this partition. Without loss of generality, suppose j ∈ S1. Consider the remain-
ing partition (S2, ...,Sn) enhanced in an arbitrary way by the items of S1 { j }. This is a (n−1)-
partition of M { j } where the value of agent i for any bundle is at least µi (n, M). Thus, we have
µi (n−1, M { j })≥µi (n, M).
We are now ready for the 1/2-approximation, obtained by Algorithm 2 below, which is based
on using Greedy Round-Robin, but only after we allocate first the most valuable goods. This
is done so that the value of vmax drops to an extent that Greedy Round-Robin can achieve a
multiplicative approximation.
ALGORITHM 2: APX-MMS1/2(N , M ,VN )
1 Set S =M
2 for i = 1 to |N | do
3 Let αi =
∑
j∈S vi j
|N |
4 while ∃i , j s.t. vi j ≥αi /2 do
5 Allocate j to i .
6 S = S { j }
7 N =N {i }
8 Recompute the αi s.
9 Run Greedy Round-Robin on the remaining instance.
Theorem 3.5. Let N be a set of n agents, and let M be a set of goods. Algorithm 2 produces an
allocation (S1, ...,Sn) such that
vi (Si )≥ 1
2
µi (n, M) , ∀i ∈N .
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Proof. We will distinguish two cases. Consider an agent i who was allocated a single item dur-
ing the first phase of the algorithm (lines 4 - 8). Suppose that at the time when i was given her
item, there were n1 active agents, n1 ≤ n, and that S was the set of currently unallocated items.
By the design of the algorithm, this means that the value of what i received is at least∑
j∈S vi j
2n1
≥ 1
2
µi (n1,S)
where the inequality follows by Claim 3.1. But now if we apply the monotonicity property
(Lemma 3.4) n−n1 times, we get that µi (n1,S)≥µi (n, M), and we are done.
Consider now an agent i , who gets a bundle of goods according to Greedy Round-Robin, in
the second phase of the algorithm. Let n2 be the number of active agents at that point, and S
be the set of goods that are unallocated before Greedy Round-Robin is executed. We know that
vmax at that point is less than half the current value of αi for agent i . Hence by the additive
guarantee of Greedy Round-Robin, we have that the bundle received by agent i has value at
least ∑
j∈S vi j
n2
− vmax >
∑
j∈S vi j
n2
− αi
2
=
∑
j∈S vi j
2n2
≥ 1
2
µi (n2,S) .
Again, after applying the monotonicity property repeatedly, we get that µi (n2,S) ≥ µi (n, M),
which completes the proof.
4 A Polynomial Time
(
2
3−ε
)
-approximation
The main result of this section is Theorem 4.1, establishing a polynomial time algorithm for
achieving a 2/3-approximation to the maximin share of each agent.
Theorem 4.1. Let N be a set of n agents, and let M be a set of goods. For any constant ε > 0,
Algorithm 3 produces in polynomial time an allocation (S1, ...,Sn), such that
vi (Si )≥
(
2
3
−ε
)
µi (n, M) , ∀i ∈N .
Our result is based on the algorithm by Procaccia and Wang [2014], which also guarantees
to each agent a 2/3-approximation. However, their algorithm runs in polynomial time only
for a constant number of agents. Here, we identify the source of exponentiality and take a
different approach regarding certain parts of the algorithm. For the sake of completeness, we
first present the necessary related results of Procaccia and Wang [2014], before we discuss the
steps that are needed to obtain our result.
First of all, we note that even the computation of the maximin share values is already a hard
problem. For a single agent i , the problem of deciding whether µi (n, M) ≥ k for a given k is
NP-complete. However, a PTAS follows by the work of Woeginger [1997]. In the original paper,
which is in the context of job scheduling, Woeginger gave a PTAS for maximizing the minimum
completion time on identical machines. But this scheduling problem is identical to computing
a maximin partition with respect to a given agent i . Indeed, from agent i ’s perspective, it is
enough to think of the machines as identical agents (the only input that we need for computing
µi (n, M) is the valuation function of i ). Hence:
Theorem 4.2 (Follows by [Woeginger, 1997]). Suppose we have a set M of goods to be divided
among n agents. Then, for each agent i , there exists a PTAS for approximating µi (n, M).
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A central quantity in the algorithm of Procaccia and Wang [2014] is the n-density balance
parameter, denoted by ρn and defined below. Before stating the definition, we give for clarity
the high level idea, which can be seen as an attempt to generalize the monotonicity property
of Lemma 3.4. Assume that in the course of an algorithm, we have used a subset of the items
to “satisfy” some of the agents, and that those items do not have “too much” value for the rest
of the agents. If k is the number of remaining agents, and S is the remaining set of goods,
then we should expect to be able to “satisfy” these k agents using the items in S. A good ap-
proximation in this reduced instance however, would only be an approximation with respect
to µi (k,S). Hence, in order to hope for an approximation algorithm for the original instance,
we would need to examine howµi (k,S) relates toµi (n, M). Essentially, the parameter ρn is the
best guarantee one can hope to achieve for the remaining agents, based only on the fact that
the complement of the set left to be shared is of relatively small value. Formally:
Definition 4.3 ([Procaccia and Wang, 2014]). For any number n of agents, let
ρn =max
{
λ
∣∣∣∣ ∀M ,∀ additive vi ∈ (R+)2M ,∀S ⊆M ,∀k,` s.t. k+`= n,vi (M S)≤ `λµi (n, M)⇒µi (k,S)≥λµi (n, M)
}
.
After a quite technical analysis, Procaccia and Wang calculate the exact value of ρn in the
following lemma.
Lemma 4.4 (Lemma 3.2 of [Procaccia and Wang, 2014]). For any n ≥ 2,
ρn = 2bncodd
3bncodd −1
> 2
3
,
where bncodd denotes the largest odd integer less than or equal to n.
We are now ready to state our algorithm, referred to as APX-MMS (Algorithm 3 below). We
elaborate on the crucial differences between Algorithm 3 and the result of Procaccia and Wang
[2014] after the algorithm description (namely after Lemma 4.5). At first, the algorithm com-
putes each agent’s (1−ε′)-approximate maximin value using Woeginger’s PTAS, where ε′ = 3ε4 .
Let ξ = (ξ1, . . . ,ξn) be the vector of these values. Hence, ∀i , µi (n, M) ≥ ξi ≥ (1− ε′)µi (n, M).
Then, APX-MMS makes a call to the recursive algorithm REC-MMS (Algorithm 4) to compute a(2
3 −ε
)
-approximate partition. REC-MMS takes the arguments ε′,n = |N |, ξ, S (the set of items
that have not been allocated yet), K (the set of agents that have not received a share of items
yet), and the valuation functions VK = {vi |i ∈ K }. The guarantee provided by REC-MMS is that
as long as the already allocated goods are not worth too much for the currently active agents of
K , we can satisfy them with the remaining goods. More formally, under the assumption that
∀i ∈K , vi (M S)≤ (n−|K |)ρnµi (n, M) , (1)
which we will show that it holds before each call, REC-MMS(ε′,n,ξ,S,K ,VK ) computes a |K |-
partition of S, so that each agent receives items of value at least (1−ε′)ρnξi .
The initial call of the recursion is, of course, REC-MMS(ε′,n,ξ, M , N ,VN ). Before moving on
to the next recursive call, REC-MMS appropriately allocates some of the items to some of the
agents, so that they receive value at least (1−ε′)ρnξi each. This is achieved by identifying an
appropriate matching between some currently unsatisfied agents and certain bundles of items,
as described in the algorithm. In particular, the most important step in the algorithm is to first
compute the set X+ (line 6), which is the set of agents that will not be matched in the current
call. The remaining active agents, i.e., K X+, are then guaranteed to get matched in the current
round, whereas X+ will be satisfied in the next recursive calls. In order to ensure this for X+,
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REC-MMS guarantees that inequality (1) holds for K = X+ and with S being the rest of the items.
Note that (1) trivially holds for the initial call of REC-MMS, where K =N and S =M .
ALGORITHM 3: APX-MMS(ε, N , M ,VN )
1 ε′ = 3ε4
2 for i = 1 to |N | do
3 Use Woeginger’s PTAS to compute a (1−ε′)-approximation ξi of µi (|N |, M). Let
ξ= (ξ1, . . . ,ξn).
4 return REC-MMS(ε′, |N |,ξ, M , N ,VN )
For simplicity, in the description of REC-MMS, we assume that K = {1,2, . . ., |K |}. Also, for the
bipartite graph defined below in the algorithm, by Γ(X+) we denote the set of neighbors of the
vertices in X+.
ALGORITHM 4: REC-MMS(ε′,n,ξ,S,K ,VK )
1 if |K | = 1 then
2 Allocate all of S to agent 1.
3 else
4 Use Woeginger’s PTAS to compute a (1−ε′)-approximate |K |-maximin partition of S with
respect to agent 1 from K , say (S1, . . . ,S|K |).
5 Create a bipartite graph G = (X ∪Y ,E), where X = Y =K and E = {(i , j ) | i ∈ X , j ∈ Y ,
vi (S j )≥ (1−ε′)ρnξi }.
6 Find a set X+ ⊂ X , as described in Lemma 4.5.
7 Given a perfect matching A, between X X+ and a subset of Y Γ(X+), allocate S j to agent i iff
(i , j ) ∈ A (the matching is a byproduct of line 6).
8 if X+ =; then
9 Output the above allocation.
10 else
11 Output the above allocation, together with REC-MMS(ε′,n,ξ,S∗, X+,VX +), where S∗ is the
subset of S not allocated in line 7.
To proceed with the analysis, and since the choice of X+ plays an important role (line 6 of
Algorithm 4), we should first clarify what properties of X+ are needed for the algorithm to work.
The following lemma is the most crucial part in the design of our algorithm.
Lemma 4.5. Assume that for n, M, S, K , VK inequality (1) holds and let G = (X ∪Y ,E) be the
bipartite graph defined in line 5 of REC-MMS. Then there exists a subset X+ of X {1}, such that:
(i) X+ can be found efficiently.
(ii) There exists a perfect matching between X X+ and a subset of Y Γ(X+).
(iii) If we allocate subsets to agents according to such a matching (as described in line 7) and
X+ 6= ;, then inequality (1) holds for n, M, S∗, X+, VX+ where S∗ ⊆ S is the unallocated set
of items, i.e.:
∀i ∈ X+, vi (M S∗)≤ (n−|X+|)ρnµi (n, M) .
Before we prove Lemma 4.5, we elaborate on the main differences between our setup and
the approach of Procaccia and Wang [2014]:
Choice of X+. In Procaccia and Wang [2014], X+ is defined as argmaxZ⊆K {1}{|Z | | |Z | ≥ |Γ(Z )|}.
Clearly, when n is constant, so is |K |, and thus the computation of X+ is trivial. However, it is
not clear how to efficiently find such a set in general, when n is not constant. We propose a
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definition of X+, which is efficiently computable and has the desired properties. In short, our
X+ is any appropriately selected counterexample to Hall’s Theorem for the graph G constructed
in line 5.
Choice of ε. The algorithm works for any ε> 0, but Procaccia and Wang [2014] choose an ε that
depends on n, and it is such that (1−ε)ρn ≥ 23 . This is possible since for any n, ρn ≥ 23
(
1+ 13n−1
)
.
However, in this case, the running time of Woeginger’s PTAS (line 4) is not polynomial in n.
Here, we consider any fixed ε, independent of n, hence the approximation ratio of 23 −ε.
The formal definition of X+ is given within the proof of Lemma 4.5 that follows.
Proof of Lemma 4.5. We will show that either X+ =; (in the case where G has a perfect match-
ing), or some set X+ with X+ ∈ {Z ⊆ X : |Z | > |Γ(Z )|∧∃matching of size |X Z | in G {Z∪Γ(Z )}}
has the desired properties. Moreover, we propose a way to find such a set efficiently. We first
find a maximum matching B of G . If |B | = |K |, then we are done, since for X+ = ;, properties
(i) and (ii) of Lemma 4.5 hold, while we need not check (iii). If |B | < |K |, then there must be
a subset of X violating the condition of Hall’s Theorem.1 Let Xu , Xm be the partition of X in
unmatched and matched vertices respectively, according to B , with Xu 6= ;, Xm 6= ;. Similarly,
we define Yu ,Ym .
We now construct a directed graph G ′ = (X ∪Y ,E ′), where we direct all edges of G from X
to Y , and on top of that, we add one copy of each edge of the matching but with direction from
Y to X . In particular, ∀i ∈ X ,∀ j ∈ Y , if (i , j ) ∈ E then (i , j ) ∈ E ′, and moreover if (i , j ) ∈ B then
( j , i ) ∈ E ′. We claim that the following set satisfies the desired properties
X+ := Xu ∪ {v ∈ X : v is reachable from Xu in G ′} .
Note that X+ is easy to compute; after finding the maximum matching in G , and construct-
ing G ′, we can run a depth-first search in each connected component of G ′, starting from the
vertices of Xu . See also Figure 1, after the proof of Theorem 4.1 for an illustration.
Given the definition of X+, we now show property (ii). Back to the original graph G , we first
claim that |X+| > |Γ(X+)|. To prove this, note that if j ∈ Γ(X+) in G , then j ∈ Ym . If not, then it is
not difficult to see that there is an augmenting path from a vertex in Xu to j , which contradicts
the maximality of B . Indeed, since j ∈ Γ(X+), let i be a neighbor of j in X+. If i ∈ Xu , then the
edge (i , j ) would enlarge the matching. Otherwise, i ∈ Xm and since also i ∈ X+, there is a path
in G ′ from some vertex of Xu to i . But this path by construction of the directed graph G ′ must
consist of an alternation of unmatched and matched edges, hence together with (i , j ) we have
an augmenting path.
Therefore, Γ(X+)⊆ Ym , i.e., for any j ∈ Γ(X+), there is an edge (i , j ) in the matching B . But
then i has to belong to X+ by the construction of G ′ (and since j ∈ Γ(X+)). To sum up: for any
j ∈ Γ(X+), there is exactly one distinct vertex i , with (i , j ) ∈ E , and i ∈ X+∩Xm , i.e., |X+∩Xm | ≥
|Γ(X+)|. In fact, we have equality here, because it is also true that for any i ∈ X+∩Xm , there is
a distinct vertex j ∈ Ym which is trivially reachable from X+. Hence, |X+∩Xm | = |Γ(X+)|. Since
Xu 6= ;, we have |X+| = |Xu |+ |X+∩Xm | ≥ 1+|Γ(X+)|. So, |X+| > |Γ(X+)|.
Also, note that X+ ⊆ X {1}, because for any Z ⊆ X that contains vertex 1 we have |Γ(Z )| =
|K | ≥ |Z |. This is due to the fact that for any vertex j ∈ Y , the edge (1, j ) is present by the
construction, since v1(S j )≥ (1−ε′)µ1(k,S)≥ (1−ε′)ρnµ1(n, M)≥ (1−ε′)ρnξ1, for all 1≤ j ≤ |K |.
We now claim that if we remove X+ and Γ(X+) from G , then the restriction of B on the
remaining graph, still matches all vertices of X X+, establishing property (ii). Indeed, note
1The special case of Hall’s Theorem [Hall, 1935] used here, states that given a bipartite graph G = (X ∪Y ,E),
where X ,Y are disjoint independent sets with |X | = |Y |, there is a perfect matching in G if and only if |W | ≤ |Γ(W )|
for every W ⊆ X .
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first that for any i ∈ X X+, it has to hold that i ∈ Xm , since X+ contains Xu . Also, for any
edge (i , j ) ∈ B with i ∈ X and j ∈ Γ(X+), we have i ∈ X+ by the construction of X+. So, for any
i ∈ X X+, its pair in B belongs to Y Γ(X+). Equivalently, B induces a perfect matching between
X X+ and a subset of Y Γ(X+) (this is the matching A in line 7 of the algorithm).
What is left to prove is that property (iii) also holds for X+. This can be done by the same
arguments as in Procaccia and Wang [2014], specifically by the following lemma which can be
inferred from their work.
Lemma 4.6 ([Procaccia and Wang, 2014], end of Subsection 3.1). Assume that inequality (1)
holds for n, M, S, K , VK , and let G be the graph defined in line 5. For any Z ⊆ X , if there exists a
perfect matching between X Z and a subset of Y Γ(Z ), say Y ∗, and there are no edges between
Z and Y ∗ in G, then property (iii) holds as well.
Clearly, there are no edges between X+ and Y Γ(X+). Hence, Lemma 4.6 can be applied to
X+, completing the proof.
Given Lemma 4.5, we can now prove the main result of this section, the correctness of
APX-MMS.
Proof of Theorem 4.1. It is clear that the running time of the algorithm is polynomial. Its cor-
rectness is based on the correctness of REC-MMS. The latter can be proven with strong induc-
tion on |K |, the number of still active agents that REC-MMS receives as input, under the assump-
tion that (1) holds before each new call of REC-MMS (which we have established by Lemma 4.5).
For |K | = 1, assuming that inequality (1) holds, we have for agent 1 of K :
v1(S)= v1(M)− v1(M S)≥ nµ1(n, M)− (n−1)ρnµ1(n, M)
≥µ1(n, M)≥
(
2
3
−ε
)
µ1(n, M).
For the inductive step, Lemma 4.5 and the choice of X+ are crucial. Consider an execution
of REC-MMS during which some agents will receive a subset of items and the rest will form the
set X+ to be handled recursively. For all the agents in X+ –if any– we are guaranteed
(2
3 − ε
)
-
approximate shares by property (iii) of Lemma 4.5 and by the inductive hypothesis. On the
other hand, for each agent i that receives a subset S j of items in line 7, we have
vi (S j )≥ (1−ε′)ρnξi ≥ (1−ε′)2ρnµi (n, M)> (1−2ε′)
2
3
µi (n, M)=
(
2
3
−ε
)
µi (n, M) ,
where the first inequality holds because (i , j ) ∈ E(G).
In Figure 1, we give a simple snapshot to illustrate a recursive call of REC-MMS. In partic-
ular, in Subfigure 1(a), we see a bipartite graph G that could be the current configuration for
REC-MMS, along with a maximum matching. In Subfigure 1(b), we see the construction of G ′,
as described in Lemma 4.5, and the set X+. The bold (black) edges in G ′ signify that both di-
rections are present. The set X+ consists then of Xu and all other vertices of X reachable from
Xu . Finally, Subfigure 1(b) also shows the set of agents that are satisfied in the current call along
with the corresponding perfect matching, as claimed in Lemma 4.5.
We note that the analysis of the algorithm is tight, given the analysis on ρn (see Section 3.3
of Procaccia and Wang [2014]). Improving further on the approximation ratio of 2/3 seems to
require drastically new ideas and it is a challenging open problem. We stress that even a PTAS
is not currently ruled out by the lower bound constructions [Kurokawa et al., 2016, Procaccia
and Wang, 2014]. Related to this, in the next section we consider two special cases in which we
can obtain better positive results.
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(a) The graph G defined in line 5
of Algorithm 4 shown with a max-
imum matching (blue edges).
Agent 1 is the top vertex of X .
(b) The graph G ′ defined in the proof of Lemma 4.5, where for
clarity, agent 1 and her edges are grayed out. The black edges
signify that both directions are present, i.e., they correspond
to pairs of anti-parallel edges. On the right we show the actual
allocation resulting from G .
Figure 1: Ilustration of G , G ′ and X+.
5 Two Special Cases
In this section, we consider two interesting special cases, where we have improved approxima-
tions. The first is the case of n = 3 agents, where we obtain a 7/8-approximation, improving on
the 3/4-approximation of Procaccia and Wang [2014]. The second is the case where all values
for the goods belong to {0,1,2}. This is an extension of the {0,1} setting discussed in Bouveret
and Lemaître [2016], and we show how to get an exact allocation without any approximation
loss.
5.1 The Case of n = 3 Agents
For n = 2, it is pointed out in Bouveret and Lemaître [2016] that maximin share allocations exist
via an analog of the cut and choose protocol. Using the PTAS of Woeginger [1997], we can then
have a (1− ε)-approximation in polynomial time. In contrast, as soon as we move to n = 3,
things become more interesting. It is proven that with 3 agents there exist instances where no
maximin share allocation exists [Procaccia and Wang, 2014]. The best known approximation
guarantee is 34 by observing that the quantity ρn , defined in Section 4, satisfies ρ3 ≥ 34 .
We provide a different algorithm, improving the approximation to 78 − ε. To do this, we
combine ideas from both algorithms presented so far in Sections 3 and 4. The main result of
this subsection is as follows:
Theorem 5.1. Let N = {1,2,3} be a set of three agents with additive valuations, and let M be
a set of goods. For any constant ε > 0, Algorithm 5 produces in polynomial time an allocation
(S1,S2,S3), such that
vi (Si )≥
(
7
8
−ε
)
µi (3, M) , ∀i ∈N .
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The algorithm is shown below. Before we prove Theorem 5.1, we provide here a brief outline
of how the algorithm works.
Algorithm Outline: First, approximate values for theµi s are calculated as before. Then, if there
are items with large value to some agent, in analogy to Algorithm 2, we first allocate one of those
reducing this way the problem to the simple case of n = 2. If there are no items of large value,
then the first agent partitions the items as in Algorithm 4. In the case where this partition does
not satisfy all three agents, then the second agent repartitions two of the bundles of the first
agent. Actually, she tries two different such repartitions, and we show that at least one of them
works out. The definition of a bipartite preference graph and a corresponding matching (as in
Algorithm 4) is never mentioned explicitly here. However, the main idea (and the difference
with Algorithm 4) is that if there are several ways to pick a perfect matching between X X+
and a subset of Y Γ(X+), then we try them all and choose the best one. Of course, since n = 3,
if there is no perfect matching in the preference graph, then X X+ is going to be just a single
vertex, and we only have to examine two possible perfect matchings between X X+ and a
subset of Y Γ(X+).
ALGORITHM 5: APX-3-MMS(ε, M , v1, v2, v3)
1 ε′ = 87ε
2 Compute a (1−ε)-approximation ξi of µi (3, M) for i ∈ {1,2,3}.
3 if ∃i ∈ {1,2,3}, j ∈M such that vi j ≥ 78ξi then
4 Give item j to agent i and divide M { j } among the other two agents in a “cut-and-choose"
fashion.
5 else
6 Agent 1 computes a (1−ε)-approximate maximin partition of M into three sets, say
(A1, A2, A3).
7 if ∃ j2, j3 ∈ {1,2,3} such that j2 6= j3, v2(A j2 )≥ 78ξ2 and v3(A j3 )≥ 78ξ3 then
8 Give set A j2 to agent 2, set A j3 to agent 3, and the last set to agent 1.
9 else
10 There are two sets that have value less than 78ξ2 w.r.t. agent 2, say for simplicity A2 and
A3.
11 Agent 2 computes (1−ε′)-approximate 2-maximin partitions of A1∪ A2 and A1∪ A3, say
(B1,B2) and (B ′1,B
′
2) respectively, and discards the partition with the smallest maximin
value. Let (D1,D2) be the partition she keeps.
12 Agent 3 takes the set she prefers from (D1,D2); agent 2 gets the other, and agent 1 gets
M (D1∪D2).
Proof of Theorem 5.1. First, note that for constant ε the algorithm runs in time polynomial in
|M |. Next, we prove the correctness of the algorithm.
If the output is computed in lines 3-4 then for agent i , as defined in line 3, the value she
receives is at least 78ξi ≥ 78 (1− ε)µi (3, M) >
(7
8 − ε
)
µi (3, M). The remaining two agents i1, i2
essentially apply an approximate version of a cut and choose protocol. Agent i1 computes a
(1−ε)-approximate 2-maximin partition of M { j }, say (C1,C2), then agent i2 takes the set she
prefers among C1 and C2, and agent i1 gets the other. By the monotonicity lemma (Lemma
3.4), we know that µi1 (2, M { j }) ≥ µi1 (3, M), and thus no matter which set is left for agent i1,
she is guaranteed a total value of at least (1−ε)µi1 (3, M) >
(7
8 −ε
)
µi1 (3, M). Similarly, we have
µi2 (2, M { j })≥µi2 (3, M), and therefore vi2 (M { j })≥ 2µi2 (3, M). Since i2 chooses before i1, she
is guaranteed a total value that is at least µi2 (3, M)>
(7
8 −ε
)
µi2 (3, M).
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If the output is computed in lines 6-8 then clearly all agents receive a (7/8−ε)-approximation,
since for agent 1 it does not matter which of the Ai s she gets.
The most challenging case is when the output is computed in lines 10-12 (starting with
the partition from line 6). Then, as before, agent 1 receives a value that is at least a (7/8− ε)-
approximation no matter which of the three sets she gets. For agents 2 and 3, however, the
analysis is not straightforward. We need the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2. Let N , M ,ε be as above, such that for all j ∈ M we have v2 j < 78ξ2. Consider any
partition of M into 3 sets A1, A2, A3 and assume that there are no j2, j3 ∈ {1,2,3} such that j2 6= j3,
v2(A j2 )≥ 78ξ2 and v3(A j3 )≥ 78ξ3. Then lines 10-12 of Algorithm 5 produce an allocation (S2,S3)
for agents 2 and 3, such that for i ∈ {2,3}: vi (Si ) ≥
(7
8 −ε
)
µi (3, M). Moreover, if agent 1 is given
set Ak , then S2∪S3 =⋃`∈N k A`.
Clearly, Lemma 5.2 completes the proof.
Before stating the proof of Lemma 5.2, we should mention how it is possible to go beyond
the previously known 34 -approximation. As noted above, ρn is by definition the best guarantee
we can get, based only on the fact that the complement of the set left to be shared is not too
large. As a result, the 78 ratio cannot be guaranteed just by the excess value. Instead, in addition
to making sure that the remaining items are valuable enough for the remaining agents, we
further argue about how a maximin partition would distribute those items.
There is an alternative interpretation of Algorithm 5 in terms of Algorithm 3. Whenever
only a single agent (i.e., agent 1) is going to become satisfied in the first recursive call, we try all
possible maximum matchings of the graph G for the calculation of X+. Then we proceed with
the “best” such matching. Here, for n = 3, this means we only have to consider two possibilities
for the set agent 1 is going to get matched to; it is either A2 or A3 (subject to the assumptions in
Algorithm 5).
Proof of Lemma 5.2. First, recall that v2(M)≥ 3µ2(3, M)≥ 3ξ2. Like in the description of the al-
gorithm we may assume that agent 1 gets set A3, without loss of generality. Before we move to
the analysis we should lay down some facts. Let (B1,B2) be agent 2’s (1−ε′)-approximate max-
imin partition of A1∪A2 computed in line 11; similarly (B ′1,B ′2) is agent 2’s (1−ε′)-approximate
maximin partition of A1 ∪ A3. We may assume that v2(B1) ≥ v2(B2). Also, assume that in
line 11 of the algorithm we have (D1,D2) = (B1,B2), i.e., min{v2(B ′1), v2(B ′2)} ≤ v2(B2) and M
(D1 ∪D2) = A3. The case where (D1,D2) = (B ′1,B ′2) is symmetric. Our goal is to show that
v2(B2)≥
(7
8 −ε
)
µ2(3, M). For simplicity, we write µ2 instead of µ2(3, M).
Note, towards a contradiction, that
v2(B2)<
(
7
8
−ε
)
µ2 ⇒
(1−ε′)µ2(2, A1∪ A2)<
(
7
8
−ε
)
µ2 ⇒
(1−ε′)µ2(2, A1∪ A2)<
(
7
8
− 7
8
ε′
)
µ2 ⇒
µ2(2, A1∪ A2)<
7
8
µ2 .
Moreover, this means min{v2(B ′1), v2(B
′
2)}<
(7
8 −ε
)
µ2 as well, which leads toµ2(2, A1∪A3)<
7
8µ2. So, it suffices to show that either µ2(2, A1 ∪ A2) or µ2(2, A1 ∪ A3) is at least 78µ2. This
statement is independent of the Bi s and in what follows we consider exact maximin partitions
with respect to agent 2. Before we proceed, we should make clear that for the case we are
analyzing there are indeed exactly two sets in {A1, A2, A3} each with value less than
7
8µ2 with
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respect to agent 2, as claimed in line 10 of the algorithm. Indeed, notice that in any partition
of M there is at least one set with value at least µ2 with respect to agent 2, due to the fact that
v2(M)≥ 3µ2 and by the definition of a maximin partition. If, however, there were at least 2 sets
in {A1, A2, A3} with value at least
7
8ξ2, then we would be at the case handled in steps 6-8. Hence,
there will be exactly two sets each with value less than 78ξ2 ≤ 78µ2 for agent 2 and as stated in
the algorithm we assume these are the sets A2, A3.
Consider a 3-maximin share allocation (A′1, A
′
2, A
′
3) of M with respect to agent 2. Let Fi =
A′i ∩ A3 for i = 1,2,3. Without loss of generality, we may assume that v2(F1)≤ v2(F2)≤ v2(F3).
If v2(F1)≤ 18µ2, then the partition (A′1 A3, (A′2∪ A′3) A3) is a partition of A1∪ A2 such that
v2(A
′
1 A3)= v2(A′1)− v2(F1)≥µ2−
1
8
µ2 =
7
8
µ2
and
v2((A
′
2∪ A′3) A3)≥ v2(A′2)+ v2(A′3)− v2(A3)≥ 2µ2−
7
8
µ2 =
9
8
µ2 .
So, in this case we conclude that µ2(2, A1∪ A2)≥ 78µ2.
On the other hand, if v2(F1)> 18µ2 we are going to show that µ2(2, A1∪ A3)≥ 78µ2. Towards
this we consider a 2-maximin share allocation (C1,C2) of A1 with respect to agent 2 and let us
assume that v2(C1)≥ v2(C2). For a rough depiction of the different sets involved in the following
arguments, see Figure 2.
Figure 2: Assuming that the set of items M is represented by a rectangle, here is a depiction
of several sets involved in the proof of Lemma 5.2. Recall that (A1, A2, A3) and (A′1, A
′
2, A
′
3) are
partitions of M , (C1,C2) is a partition of A1, and Fi = A′i ∩ A3 for i = 1,2,3.
Claim 5.3. For C1,C2, A3,F1,F2,F3 as above, we have
(i) v2(A3)+ v2(C2)≥ 78µ2, and
(ii) v2(F1)+ v2(F2)+ v2(C1)> 78µ2.
Proof. Note that
v2(C1)+ v2(C2)+ v2(A3)= v2(M)− v2(A2)> 3µ2−
7
8
µ2 =
17
8
µ2 .
If v2(A3)+ v2(C2)< 78µ2 then v2(C1)> 108 µ2. Moreover,
v2(A3)= v2(F1)+ v2(F2)+ v2(F3)≥ 3v2(F1)> 3
8
µ2 ,
so v2(A3)+ v2(C2)< 78µ2 implies that v2(C2)< 48µ2.
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Let d denote the difference v2(C1)− v2(C2); clearly d > 68µ2. It is not hard to see that
min j∈C1 v2 j ≥ d . Indeed, suppose there existed some j ∈C1 such that v2 j < d . Then, by moving
j from C1 to C2 we increase the minimum value of the partition, which contradicts the choice
of (C1,C2).
Since v2(C1) > 108 µ2 and no item has value more than 78µ2 for agent 2, this means that C1
contains at least two items. Thus, v2(C1)≥min j∈C1 v2 j > 128 µ2.
Now, for any item g ∈ argmin j∈C1 v2 j , the partition ({g }, A1 {g }) is strictly better than (C1,C2),
since v2g > 68µ2 > v2(C2) and v2(A1 {g }) = v2(A1)− v2g ≥ v2(C1)− v2g > 128 µ2− 68µ2 = 68µ2 >
v2(C2). Again, this contradicts the choice of (C1,C2). Hence, it must be that v2(A3)+ v2(C2) ≥
7
8µ2.
The proof of (ii) is simpler. Notice that
v2(F1)+ v2(F2)+ v2(C1)≥ v2(F1)+ v2(F1)+ 1
2
v2(A1)
> 1
8
µ2+
1
8
µ2+
1
2
(
3µ2−
7
8
µ2−
7
8
µ2
)= 7
8
µ2 .  
Now, if v2(C1)≥ 78µ2 then (i) of Claim 5.3 implies that min{v2(C1), v2(A3∪C2)}≥ 78µ2. Simi-
larly, if v2(F3)+v2(C2)≥ 78µ2 then (ii) of Claim 5.3 implies that min{v2(F1∪F2∪C1), v2(F3∪C2)}≥
7
8µ2. In both cases, we have µ2(2, A1∪ A3) ≥ 78µ2. So, it is left to examine the case where both
v2(C1) and v2(F3)+ v2(C2) are less than 78µ2.
Claim 5.4. Let C1,C2, A3,F1,F2,F3 be as above and max{v2(C1), v2(F3∪C2)}< 78µ2. Then min{v2(F1∪
C1), v2(F2∪F3∪C2)}≥ 78µ2.
Proof. Recall that v2(A1)+ v2(A3) > 178 µ2. Suppose v2(F1∪C1) < 78µ2. Then v2(F2∪F3∪C2) >
10
8 µ2. Since v2(F3∪C2)< 78µ2 we have v2(F2)> 38µ2. But then we get the contradiction
7
8
µ2 > v2(A3)= v2(F1)+ v2(F2)+ v2(F3)≥
1
8
µ2+
3
8
µ2+
3
8
µ2 =
7
8
µ2 .
Hence, v2(F1∪C1) ≥ 78µ2. Similarly, suppose v2(F2∪F3∪C2) < 78µ2. Then v2(F1∪C1) > 108 µ2.
Since v2(C1)< 78µ2 we have v2(F1)> 38µ2. Then we get the contradiction
7
8
µ2 > v2(A3)= v2(F1)+ v2(F2)+ v2(F3)≥
3
8
µ2+
3
8
µ2+
3
8
µ2 =
9
8
µ2 .
Hence, v2(F2∪F3∪C2)≥ 78µ2.  
Claim 5.4 implies µ2(2, A1∪ A3)≥ 78µ2 and this concludes the proof.
5.2 Values in {0,1,2}
Bouveret and Lemaître [2016] consider a binary setting where all valuation functions take val-
ues in {0,1}, i.e., for each i ∈ N , and j ∈ M , vi j ∈ {0,1}. This can correspond to expressing ap-
proval or disapproval for each item. It is then shown that it is always possible to find a maximin
share allocation in polynomial time. In fact, they show that the Greedy Round-Robin algorithm,
presented in Section 3, computes such an allocation in this case.
Here, we extend this result to the setting where each vi j is in {0,1,2}, allowing the agents to
express two types of approval for the items. Enlarging the set of possible values from {0,1} to
{0,1,2} by just one extra possible value makes the problem significantly more complex. Greedy
Round-Robin does not work in this case, so a different algorithm is developed.
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Theorem 5.5. Let N = [n] be a set of agents and M = [m] be a set of items. If for any i ∈N , agent
i has a valuation function vi such that vi j ∈ {0,1,2} for any j ∈ M, then we can find, in time
O(nm logm), an allocation (T1, . . . ,Tn) of M so that vi (Ti )≥µi (n, M) for every i ∈ [n].
To design our algorithm, we make use of an important observation by Bouveret and Lemaître
[2016] that allows us to reduce appropriately the space of valuation functions that we are in-
terested in. We say that the agents have fully correlated valuation functions if they agree on a
common ranking of the items in decreasing order of values. That is, ∀i ∈ N , if M = {1,2, ...,m},
we have vi 1 ≥ vi 2 ≥ . . .≥ vi m . In Bouveret and Lemaître [2016], the authors show that to find a
maximin share allocation for any set of valuation functions, it suffices to do so in an instance
where the valuation functions are fully correlated. This family of instances seems to be the dif-
ficulty in computing such allocations. Actually, their result preserves approximation ratios as
well (with the same proof); hence we state this stronger version. For a valuation function vi
let σi be a permutation on the items such that vi (σi ( j ))≥ vi (σi ( j +1)) for j ∈ {1, . . . ,m−1}. We
denote the function vi (σi (·)) by v ↑i . Note that v ↑1, v ↑2, . . . , v ↑n are now fully correlated.
Theorem 5.6 ([Bouveret and Lemaître, 2016]). Let N = [n] be a set of agents with additive val-
uation functions, M = [m] be a set of goods and ρ ∈ (0,1]. Given an allocation (T1, . . . ,Tn) of M
so that v ↑i (Ti )≥ ρµi (n, M) for every i , one can produce in linear time an allocation (T ′1, . . . ,T ′n) of
M so that vi (T ′i )≥ ρµi (n, M) for every i .
We are ready to state a high level description of our algorithm. The detailed description,
however, is deferred to the end of this subsection. The reason for this is that the terminology
needed is gradually introduced through a series of lemmas motivating the idea behind the al-
gorithm and proving its correctness. In fact, the remainder of the subsection is the proof of
Theorem 5.5. Algorithm 6 in the end summarizes all the steps.
Algorithm Outline: We first construct v ↑1, v
↑
2, . . . , v
↑
n and work with them instead. The Greedy
Round-Robin algorithm may not directly work, but we partition the items in a similar fashion,
although without giving them to the agents. Then, we show that it is possible to choose some
subsets of items and redistribute them in a way that guarantees that everyone can get a bundle
of items with enough value. At a higher level, we could say that the algorithm simulates a vari-
ant of the Greedy Round-Robin, where for an appropriately selected set of rounds the agents
choose in the reverse order. Finally, a maximin share allocation can be obtained for the original
vi s, as described in Bouveret and Lemaître [2016].
Proof of Theorem 5.5. According to Theorem 5.6 it suffices to focus on instances where the
valuation functions take values in {0,1,2} and are fully correlated. Given such an instance
we distribute the m objects into n buckets in decreasing order, i.e., bucket i will get items
i ,n+ i ,2n+ i , . . .. Notice that this is compatible with how the Greedy Round-Robin algorithm
could distribute the items; however, we do not assign any buckets to any agents yet. We may as-
sume that m = kn for some k ∈N; if not, we just add a few extra items with 0 value to everyone.
It is convenient to picture the collection of buckets as the matrix
B =

(k−1)n+1 (k−1)n+2 · · · kn
...
...
. . .
...
n+1 n+2 · · · 2n
1 2 · · · n
 ,
since our algorithm will systematically redistribute groups of items corresponding to rows of
B .
Before we state the algorithm, we establish some properties regarding these buckets and
the way each agent views the values of these bundles. First, we introduce some terminology.
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Definition 5.7. We say that agent i is
• satisfied with respect to the current buckets, if all the buckets have value at least µi (n, M)
according to vi .
• left-satisfied with respect to the current buckets, if she is not satisfied, but at least the n/2
leftmost buckets have value at least µi (n, M) according to vi .
• right-satisfied if the same as above hold, but for the rightmost n/2 buckets.
Now suppose that we see agent i ’s view of the values in the buckets. A typical view would
have the following form (recall the goods are ranked from highest to lowest value):
0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
1 1 1 1 1 0 · · · 0 0 0
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
1 1 1 1 1 1 · · · 1 1 1
2 2 2 1 1 1 · · · 1 1 1
· · · · · · · · · · · ·
2 2 2 2 2 2 · · · 2 2 2

A row that has only 2s for i will be called a 2-row for i . A row that has both 2s and 1s will be
called a 2/1-row for i , and so forth. An agent can also have a 2/1/0-row. It is not necessary, of
course, that an agent will have all possible types of rows in her view. Note, however, that there
can be at most one 1/0-row and at most one 2/1-row in her view. We first prove the following
lemma for agents that are not initially satisfied.
Lemma 5.8. Any agent not satisfied with respect to the initial buckets must have both a 1/0-row
and a 2/1-row in her view of B. Moreover, initially all agents are either satisfied or left-satisfied.
Proof. Let us focus on the multiset of values of an agent that is not satisfied, say i . It is straight-
forward to see that if i has no 1s, or the number of 2s is a multiple of n (including 0), then agent
i gets value µi (n, M) from any bucket. So, i must have a row with both 2s and 1s. If this is a
2/1/0-row, then again it is easy to see that the initial allocation is a maximin share allocation for
i . So, i has a 2/1-row. The only case where she does not have a 1/0-row is if the total number of 1s
and 2s is a multiple of n.But then the maximum and the minimum value of the initial buckets
differ by 1, hence we have a maximin share allocation and i is satisfied.
Next we show that an agent i who is not initially satisfied is left-satisfied. In what follows
we only refer to i ’s view. Buckets B1 and Bn , indexed by the corresponding columns of B , have
maximum and minimum total value respectively. Since i is not satisfied, we have vi (B1) ≥
vi (Bn)+ 2, but the way we distributed the items guarantees that the difference between any
two buckets is at most the largest value of an item; so vi (B1) = vi (Bn)+ 2. Moreover, since
vi (M) ≥ nµi (n, M) and vi (Bn) < µi (n, M), we must have vi (B1) > µi (n, M) . This implies that
vi (B1)=µi (n, M)+1 and vi (Bn)=µi (n, M)−1.
More generally, we have buckets of value µi (n, M)+1 (leftmost columns), we have buckets
of value µi (n, M)− 1 (rightmost columns), and maybe some other buckets of value µi (n, M)
(columns in the middle). We know that the total value of all the items is at least nµi (n, M), so,
by summing up the values of the buckets, we conclude that there must be at most n/2 buckets
of value µi (n, M)−1. Therefore i is left-satisfied.  
So far we may have some agents that could take any bucket and some agents that would
take any of the n/2 (at least) first buckets. Clearly, if the left-satisfied agents are at most n/2
18
then we can easily find a maximin share allocation. However, there is no guarantee that there
are not too many left-satisfied agents initially, so we try to fix this by reversing some of the
rows of B . To make this precise, we say that we reverse the i th row of B when we take items
(i −1)n+1,(i −1)n+2, . . . , i n and we put item i n in bucket 1, item i n−1 in bucket 2, etc.
The algorithm then proceeds by picking a subset of rows of B and reversing them. The rows
are chosen appropriately so that the resulting buckets (i.e., the columns of B) can be easily
paired with the agents to get a maximin share allocation. First, it is crucial to understand the
effect that the reversal of a set of rows has to an agent.
Lemma 5.9. Any agent satisfied with respect to the initial buckets remains satisfied indepen-
dently of the rows of B that we may reverse. On the other hand, any agent not satisfied with
respect to the initial buckets, say agent i , is affected if we reverse her 1/0-row or her 2/1-row. If we
reverse only one of those, then i becomes satisfied with respect to the new buckets; if we reverse
both, then i becomes right-satisfied. The reversal of any other rows is irrelevant to agent i .
Proof. Fix an agent i . First notice that, due to symmetry, reversing any row that for i is a 2-
row, a 1-row, or a 0-row does not improve or worsen the initial allocation from i ’s point of view.
Also, clearly, reversing both the 1/0-row and the 2/1-row of a left-satisfied agent makes her right-
satisfied. Similarly, if i is satisfied and has a 2/1/0-row, or has a 2/1-row but no 1/0-row, or has a
1/0-row but no 2/1-row, then reversing those keeps i satisfied.
The interesting case is when i has both a 1/0-row and a 2/1-row. If i is satisfied, then even
removing her 1/0-row leaves all the buckets with at least as much value as the last bucket; so
reversing it keeps i satisfied. A similar argument holds for i ’s 2/1-row as well. If i is not satisfied,
then the difference of the values of the first and the last bucket will be 2. Like in the proof
of Lemma 5.8, the number of columns that have 1 in i ’s 1/0-row and 2 in i ’s 2/1-row (i.e., total
value µi (n, M)+ 1) are at least as many as the columns that have 0 in i ’s 1/0-row and 1 in i ’s
2/1-row (i.e., total value µi (n, M)−1). So, by reversing her 1/0-row, the values of all the “worst”
(rightmost) buckets increase by 1, the values of some of the “best” (leftmost) buckets decrease
by 1, and the values of the buckets in the middle either remain the same or increase by 1. The
difference between the best and the worst buckets now is 1 (at most), so this is a maximin share
allocation for i and she becomes satisfied. Due to symmetry, the same holds for reversing i ’s
2/1-row only.  
Now, what Lemma 5.9 guarantees is that when we reverse some of the rows of the initial
B , we are left with agents that are either satisfied, left-satisfied, or right-satisfied. If the rows
are chosen so that there are at most n/2 left-satisfied and at most n/2 right-satisfied agents,
then there is an obvious maximin share allocation: to any left-satisfied agent we arbitrarily give
one of the first n/2 buckets, to any right-satisfied agent we arbitrarily give one of the last n/2
buckets, and to each of the remaining agents we arbitrarily give one of the remaining buckets.
In Lemma 5.10 below, we prove that it is easy to find which rows to reverse to achieve that.
We use a graph theoretic formulation of the problem for clarity. With respect to the initial
buckets, we define a graph G = (V ,E) with V = [k], i.e., G has a vertex for each row of B . Also,
for each left-satisfied agent i , G has an edge connecting i ’s 1/0-row and 2/1-row. We delete, if
necessary, any multiple edges to get a simple graph with n edges at most. We want to color
the vertices of G with two colors, “red” (for reversed rows) and “blue” (for non reversed), so
that the number of edges having both endpoints red is at most n/2 and at the same time the
number of edges having both endpoints blue is at most n/2. Note that if we reverse the rows
that correspond to red vertices, then the agents with red endpoints become right-satisfied, the
agents with blue endpoints remain left-satisfied and the agents with both colors become satis-
fied. Moreover, the initially satisfied agents are not affected, and we can find a maximin share
allocation as previously discussed. This is illustrated in Figure 3 below.
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Figure 3: Assuming an instance with 3 agents and 11 items, the tables on top are the three
different views on the initial buckets. This results in the graph shown in the middle—before
and after the coloring. By reversing row c that corresponds to a red vertex, every agent becomes
satisfied and thus any matching of the columns to the agents defines an MMS allocation.
Lemma 5.10. Given graph G defined above, in time O(k +n) we can color the vertices with two
colors, red and blue, so that the number of edges with two red endpoints is less than n/2 and the
number of edges with two blue endpoints is at most n/2.
Proof. We start with all the vertices colored blue, and we arbitrarily recolor vertices red, one
at a time, until the number of edges with two blue endpoints becomes at most |E |/2 for the
first time. Assume this happens after recoloring vertex u. Before turning u from blue to red,
the number of edges with at most one blue endpoint was strictly less than |E |/2. Also, the
recoloring of u did not force any of the edges with two blue endpoints to become edges with
two red endpoints. So, the number of edges with two red endpoints after the recoloring of u is
at most equal to the number of edges with at most one blue endpoint before the recoloring of
u, i.e., less than |E |/2. To complete the proof, notice that |E | ≤ n. For the running time, notice
that each vertex changes color at most once and when this happens we only need to examine
the adjacent vertices in order to update the counters on each type of edges (only red, only blue,
or both).  
Lemma 5.10 completes the proof of correctness for Algorithm 6 that is summarized below.
For the running time notice that v ↑1, . . . , v
↑
n can be computed in O(nm logm), since we get v
↑
i by
sorting vi 1, . . . , vi m . Also step 5 can be computed in O(nm); for each agent i we scan the first
column of B to find her (possible) 1/0-row and 2/1-row, and then in O(n) we check whether she
is left-satisfied by checking that the positions that have 1 in i ’s 1/0-row and 2 in i ’s 2/1-row are at
least as many as the positions that have 0 in i ’s 1/0-row and 1 in i ’s 2/1-row.
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ALGORITHM 6: EXACT-MMS0,1,2(N , M ,VN )
1 Let k = dmn e. Add kn−m dummy items with value 0 for everyone.
2 if v1, . . . , vn are not fully correlated then
3 Compute v ↑1, . . . , v
↑
n and use them instead.
4 Construct a k×n matrix B so that Bi j is the (i −1)n+ j th item.
5 Find the set of left-satisfied agents and their corresponding 1/0-rows and 2/1-rows.
6 Construct a graph G = ([k],E) with E = {{i , j }|∃ left-satisfied agent that i and j are her
1/0-row and 2/1-row}.
7 Color the vertices of G with two colors, red and blue, so that the number of edges having both
endpoints red, and the number of edges having both endpoints blue, each is ≤ n/2.
8 Reverse the rows of B that correspond to red vertices, and keep track of who is satisfied,
left-satisfied, or right-satisfied.
9 Arbitrarily give some of the first n/2 buckets (columns of B) to each of the left-satisfied agents
and some of the last n/2 buckets to each of the right-satisfied agents. Arbitrarily give the rest of
the buckets to the satisfied agents.
10 if v ↑1, . . . , v
↑
n were used then
11 Based on the allocation in step 9 compute and return a maximin share allocation for the
original vi s as described in [Bouveret and Lemaître, 2016].
12 else
13 Return the allocation in step 9.
6 A Probabilistic Analysis
As argued in the previous works [Bouveret and Lemaître, 2016, Procaccia and Wang, 2014], it
has been quite challenging to prove impossibility results. Setting efficient computation aside,
what is the best ρ for which a ρ-approximate allocation does exist? All we know so far is that
ρ 6= 1 by the elaborate constructions by Kurokawa et al. [2016], and Procaccia and Wang [2014].
However, extensive experimentation by Bouveret and Lemaître [2016] (and also by Procaccia
and Wang [2014]), showed that in all generated instances, there always existed a maximin share
allocation. Motivated by these experimental observations and by the lack of impossibility re-
sults, we present a probabilistic analysis, showing that indeed we expect that in most cases
there exist allocations where every agent receives her maximin share. In particular, we analyze
the Greedy Round-Robin algorithm from Section 3 when each vi j is drawn from the uniform
distribution over [0,1].
Recently, Kurokawa et al. [2016] show similar results for a large set of distributions over [0,1],
including U [0,1]. Although, asymptotically, their results yield a theorem that is more general
than ours, we consider our analysis to be of independent interest, since we have much better
bounds on the probabilities for the special case of U [0,1], even for relatively small values of n.
For completeness, before stating and proving our results, we include the version of Hoeffd-
ing’s inequality we are going to use.
Theorem 6.1 ([Hoeffding, 1963]). Let X1, X2, . . . , Xn be independent random variables with Xi ∈
[0,1] for i ∈ [n]. Then for the empirical mean X¯ = 1n (X1+ . . .+ Xn) we have P
(
X¯ −E[X¯ ]≥ t) ≤
exp(−2nt 2).
We start with Theorem 6.2. Its proof is based on tools like Hoeffding’s and Chebyshev’s
inequalities, and on a careful estimation of the probabilities when m < 3n. Note that for m ≥
2n, the theorem provides an even stronger guarantee than the maximin share (by Claim 3.1).
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Theorem 6.2. Let N = [n] be a set of agents and M = [m] be a set of goods, and assume that
the vi j s are i.i.d. random variables that follow U [0,1]. Then, for m ≥ 2n and large enough n,
the Greedy Round-Robin algorithm allocates to each agent i a set of goods of total value at least
1
n
∑m
j=1 vi j with probability 1−o(1). The o(1) term is O(1/n) when m > 2n and O(logn/n) when
m = 2n.
Proof. In what follows we assume that agent 1 chooses first, agent 2 chooses second, and so
forth. We consider several cases for the different ranges of m. We first assume that 2n ≤m < 3n.
It is illustrative to consider the case of m = 2n and examine the nth agent that chooses
last. Like all the agents in this case, she receives exactly two items; let Yn be the total value of
those items. From her perspective, she sees n + 1 values chosen uniformly from [0,1], picks
the maximum of those, then u.a.r. n − 1 of the rest are removed, and she takes the last one
as well. If we isolate this random experiment, it is as if we take Yn = max{X1, ..., Xn+1}+ XY ,
where Y ∼U ({1,2, ...,n+1} {µ}), µ ∈ argmax{X1, ..., Xn+1}, Xi ∼U [0,1] ∀i ∈ [n+1], and all the
Xi s are independent. We estimate now the probability P(Yn ≤ a) for 1 < a < 2. We will set
a to a particular value in this interval later on. In fact, we bound this probability using the
corresponding probability for Zn =max{X1, ..., Xn+1}+XY ′ , where Y ′ ∼U {1,2, ...,n+1}. For Zn
we have
P(Zn ≤ a)=
n+1∑
i=1
∫ a
0
P
(
max
1≤ j≤n+1
X j ≤ t ∧Y = i ∧Xi ≤ a− t
)
d t
= (n+1)
∫ a
0
P
(
max
1≤ j≤n+1
X j ≤ t ∧Y = 1∧X1 ≤ a− t
)
d t
=
∫ a
0
P
(
max
1≤ j≤n+1
X j ≤ t ∧X1 ≤ a− t
)
d t
=
∫ a
0
P(X1 ≤ t ∧X1 ≤ a− t ∧X2 ≤ t ∧ . . .∧Xn+1 ≤ t )d t
=
∫ a/2
0
P(X1 ≤ t ∧X2 ≤ t ∧ . . .∧Xn+1 ≤ t )d t+
+
∫ 1
a/2
P(X1 ≤ a− t ∧X2 ≤ t ∧ . . .∧Xn+1 ≤ t )d t+
+
∫ a
1
P(X1 ≤ a− t ∧X2 ≤ t ∧ . . .∧Xn+1 ≤ t )d t
=
∫ a/2
0
t n+1d t +
∫ 1
a/2
(a− t )t nd t +
∫ a
1
(a− t )d t .
Also, by the definition of Y ′ we have P(Y ′ ∉ argmax{X1, ..., Xn+1})= n/(n+1). Therefore, for Yn
we get
P(Yn ≤ a)= P(Zn ≤ a | Y ′ ∉ argmax{X1, ..., Xn+1})
= P(Zn ≤ a ∧ Y
′ ∉ argmax{X1, ..., Xn+1})
P(Y ′ ∉ argmax{X1, ..., Xn+1})
≤ P(Zn ≤ a)
P(Y ′ ∉ argmax{X1, ..., Xn+1})
= n+1
n
P(Zn ≤ a)
= n+1
n
(∫ a/2
0
t n+1d t +
∫ 1
a/2
(a− t )t nd t +
∫ a
1
(a− t )d t
)
,
where for the inequality we used the fact that P(A∩B)≤ P(A) for any events A,B .
A similar analysis for the j th agent yields
P(Y j ≤ a)≤ 2n− j +1
n
(∫ a/2
0
t 2n− j+1d t +
∫ 1
a/2
(a− t )n− j+1t nd t +
∫ a
1
(a− t )n− j+1d t
)
.
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In the more general case where m = 2n+κ(n), 0 ≤ κ(n) < n, we have a similar calculation for
the agents that receive only two items in the Greedy Round-Robin algorithm, as well as for the
first two items of the first κ(n) agents (who receive three items each). Let Yi be the total value
agent i receives, and Wi be the value of her first two items. Of course, for the last 2n players,
Yi =Wi . Also, recall that∑mj=1 vi j = vi (M). We now relate the probability that we are interested
in estimating, with the probabilities P(Yi ≤ a) that we have already bounded. We will then
proceed by setting α appropriately. We have
P
(
∃i such that Yi < 1
n
m∑
j=1
vi j
)
≤
n∑
i=1
P
(
Yi < vi (M)
n
)
=
n∑
i=1
P
(
Yi <min
{vi (M)
n
, a
}
∨ vi (M)
n
>max{Yi , a}
)
≤
n∑
i=1
P
(
Yi <min
{vi (M)
n
, a
})
+
n∑
i=1
P
(
vi (M)
n
>max{Yi , a}
)
≤
n∑
i=1
P(Yi < a)+
n∑
i=1
P
(
vi (M)
n
> a
)
.
To upper bound the first sum we use the Wi s, i.e., we do not take into account the third item
that the first κ(n) agents receive. By the definition of Yi ,Wi , for these first κ(n) agents we have
P(Yi < a)≤ P(Wi < a), while for the remaining agents we have P(Yi < a)= P(Wi < a). Note that
the bounds for P(Yi ≤ a) calculated above, here hold for κ(n)+1 ≤ i ≤ n. For 1 ≤ i ≤ κ(n) the
same bounds hold for P(Wi ≤ a).
n∑
i=1
P(Yi < a)≤
κ(n)∑
i=1
P(Wi < a)+
n∑
i=κ(n)+1
P(Yi < a)
≤
n∑
i=1
m−i+1
n
(∫ a/2
0
t m−i+1d t +
∫ 1
a/2
(a− t )n+κ(n)−i+1t nd t +
∫ a
1
(a− t )n+κ(n)−i+1d t
)
≤ 3
n∑
j=1
(∫ a/2
0
t n+κ(n)+ j d t +
∫ 1
a/2
(a− t )κ(n)+ j t nd t +
∫ a
1
(a− t )κ(n)+ j d t
)
= 3
(
n∑
j=1
(a/2)n+κ(n)+ j+1
n+κ(n)+ j +1 +
n∑
j=1
∫ 1
a/2
(a− t )κ(n)+ j t nd t +
n∑
j=1
∫ a−1
0
uκ(n)+ j du
)
.
We are going to bound each sum separately. We set a = 1+ κ(n)2n +
√
3lnn
n = m2n +
√
3lnn
n . Note
that for n ≥ 46 we have a ∈ (1,2). Consider the first sum:
n∑
j=1
(a/2)n+κ(n)+ j+1
n+κ(n)+ j +1 ≤
(a/2)n+κ(n)+2
n+κ(n)+2
n−1∑
i=0
(a/2)i
< 1
n+κ(n)+2 ·
(a/2)n+κ(n)+2
1−a/2 =O(1/n) ,
where we got O(1/n) because the bound is at most 3n for n ≥ 57 and for any value of κ(n).
Next, we deal with the second sum:
n∑
j=1
∫ 1
a/2
(a− t )κ(n)+ j t nd t <
∫ 1
a/2
t n
( ∞∑
j=0
(a− t )κ(n)+ j
)
d t ≤
∫ 1
a/2
t n(a/2)κ(n)
1
1−a+ t d t
≤ (a/2)
κ(n)
1−a/2
∫ 1
a/2
t nd t = (a/2)
κ(n)
1−a/2
(
1− (a/2)n+1
n+1
)
=O(1/n) .
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Here, for n ≥ 58 the bound is at most 10n for any κ(n).
Finally, for the third sum, we rewrite it as
n∑
j=1
∫ a−1
0
uκ(n)+ j du =
n∑
j=1
(a−1)κ(n)+ j+1
κ(n)+ j +1 =
n+κ(n)+1∑
i=κ(n)+2
(a−1)i
i
.
We are going to bound each term separately. Consider the case where κ(n)≥ 5pn. For n ≥ 64,
it can be shown that 15
(
κ(n)
2n +
√
3lnn
n
)5pn
< 10
n3/2
. So,
n+κ(n)+1∑
i=κ(n)+2
(a−1)i
i
≤
n∑
i=1
(a−1)κ(n)
κ(n)
≤ n ·
(
κ(n)
2n +
√
3lnn
n
)5pn
5
p
n
≤ n · 10
n2
= 10
n
.
On the other hand, when κ(n) < 5pn, we have a−1 < 2.5+
p
3lnnp
n
. For n ≥ 59 and j ≥ 10 it can
be shown that 1j
(
2.5+p3lnnp
n
) j < 30
n2
. Of course, for 3≤ j ≤ 9 it is true that 1j
(
2.5+p3lnnp
n
) j = o(1/n),
and particularly for n ≥ 59 the sum ∑9i=3 1j (2.5+p3lnnpn ) j is bounded by 25n . In general, it is to be
expected to have relatively large hidden constants when m is very close to 2n. This changes
quickly though; when κ(n)> 21 the whole sum is less than 1/n. In any case, if κ(n)> 0
n+κ(n)+1∑
i=κ(n)+2
(a−1)i
i
≤
n+2∑
i=3
(a−1)i
i
≤
9∑
i=3
1
i
(
2.5+p3lnnp
n
)i + n+2∑
i=10
1
i
(
2.5+p3lnnp
n
)i ≤
≤O(1/n)+ (n−7) 30
n2
=O(1/n) .
However, if κ(n)= 0, we have
n+1∑
i=2
(a−1)i
i
=
(
2.5+p3lnnp
n
)2+n+1∑
i=3
(a−1)i
i
=O
(
logn
n
)
.
So far, we have
∑n
i=1 P(Yi < a)=O(1/n) (or O(logn/n) when m = 2n). In order to complete
the proof for this case we use Hoeffding’s inequality to bound the probability that the average
of the values for any agent is too large.
n∑
i=1
P
(
vi (M)
n
> a
)
≤ n ·P
(
v1(M)
n
> a
)
= n ·P
(
v1(M)
m
> n
m
(m
2n
+
√
3lnn
n
))
= n ·P
(
v1(M)
m
− 1
2
> n
m
√
3lnn
n
)
≤ n ·e−2m
(
n
m
√
3lnn
n
)2
= n ·e−2 nm ·3lnn ≤ n ·e−2lnn = 1
n
.
Hence,
P
(
∃i such that Yi < vi (M)
n
)
=
O
(
logn
n
)
if m = 2n
O
(
1
n
)
if 2n <m < 3n .
The remaining cases are for m ≥ 3n. We give the proof for m ≥ 4n. The cases for 3n ≤m <
3.5n and 3.5n ≤m < 4n differ in small details but they essentially follow the same analysis. We
briefly discuss these cases at the end of the proof.
Assume that kn ≤ m < (k + 1)n,k ≥ 4. We focus on the agent that choses last, i.e., agent
n, who has the smallest expected value. She gets exactly k items, and like before let Yn be the
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total value she receives. In order to bound P
(
Yn <β
)
we introduce the random variables Zn and
Wn . Consider the following random experiment involving the independent random variables
X1, . . . , Xm−n+1, Xi ∼U [0,1] ∀i ∈ [m −n + 1]. Given a realization of the Xi s, i.e., some values
x1, . . . , xm−n+1 in [0,1], Zn is defined similarly to Yn :
• Initially, Zn = 0.
• While there are still xi s left, take the maximum of the remaining xi s, add it to Zn , remove
it from the available numbers, and then remove the xi s with the n−1 highest indices.
• Return Zn .
On the other hand, Wn =∑k−1i=1 X(m+1−i n,m−i (n−1)), where X( j ,t ) is the j th order statistic of X1, . . . , X t .
That is, Wn is defined as the sum of the largest of all xi s, the second largest of the first m−n+1
xi s, the third largest of the first m−2n+2 xi s, and so on.
It is not hard to see that always Wn ≤ Zn (in fact, each term of Wn is less than or equal to
the corresponding term of Zn) and that Zn follows the same distribution as Yn . So, P
(
Yn <β
)=
P
(
Zn <β
) ≤ P(Wn <β). Using the fact that the i th order statistic in a sample of size ` drawn
independently from U [0,1] has expected value i`+1 and variance
i (`−i+1)
(`+1)2(`+2) [Gentle, 2009], we
get
E[Wn]= m−n+1
m−n+2 +
m−2n+1
m−2n+3 + . . .+
m− (k−1)n+1
m− (k−1)n+k
≥ (k−1)n+1
(k−1)n+2 +
(k−2)n+1
(k−2)n+3 + . . .+
n+1
n+k
> k−1− 1
(k−1)n −
2
(k−2)n − . . .−
k−1
n
> k−1− (k−1)Hk−1
n
.
Moreover, if X ′i = X(m+1−i n,m−i (n−1)) we have
σ2Wn =Var(Wn)=
k−1∑
i=1
k−1∑
j=1
Cov(Xi , X j )≤
k−1∑
i=1
k−1∑
j=1
√
Var(Xi )Var(X j )≤
(
k−1∑
i=1
√
Var(Xi )
)2
<
(
k−1∑
i=1
p
i
m− i n+ i +1
)2
<
(p
k−1
k−1∑
i=1
1
(k− i )n
)2
= (k−1)H
2
k−1
n2
,
where Hk−1 is the (k − 1)-th harmonic number. Now we can bound the probability that any
agent receives value less than 1/n of her total value.
P
(
Yi < vi (M)
n
)
≤ P
(
Yn < vn(M)
n
)
≤ P
(
Yn < 13k
20
)
+P
(
vn(M)
n
> 13k
20
)
.
Next, using Chebyshev’s inequality we have
P
(
Yn < 13k
20
)
≤ P
(
Wn < 13k
20
)
= P
(
E[Wn]−Wn > E[Wn]− 13k
20
)
≤ P
(
|E[Wn]−Wn | > k−1− (k−1)Hk−1
n
− 13k
20
)
≤ P
|E[Wn]−Wn | > 7k20 −1− (k−1)Hk−1np
k−1Hk−1
n
σWn

≤ (k−1)H
2
k−1((
7k−20
20
)
n− (k−1)Hk−1
)2 .
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On the other hand, using Hoeffding’s inequality,
P
(
vn(M)
n
> 13k
20
)
= P
(
vn(M)
m
− 1
2
> n
m
13k
20
− 1
2
)
≤ P
(
vn(M)
m
− 1
2
> 13k
20(k+1) −
1
2
)
≤ e−2m
(
3k−10
20(k+1)
)2
≤ e−2kn
(
3k−10
20(k+1)
)2
.
Finally, we take a union bound to get
P
(
∃i s.t. Yi < vi (M)
n
)
≤
n∑
i=1
P
(
Yi < vi (M)
n
)
≤ n
(
(k−1)H 2k−1((
7k−20
20
)
n−(k−1)Hk−1
)2 +e−2kn
(
3k−10
20(k+1)
)2)
=O(1/n) .
The exact same proof works when 3n ≤m < 3.5n, but instead of 3k−1020(k+1) in Hoeffding’s inequal-
ity, we have 3·3−520(3+0.5) and of course we should adjust E[Wn] and Var(Wn) accordingly. When
3.5n ≤m < 4n on the other hand, we need to consider three items in Wn instead of two, since
two items are not enough anymore to guarantee separation of Yi and
1
n
∑m
j=1 vi j with high prob-
ability. That said, the proof is the same, but we should adjust E[Wn] and Var(Wn), and instead
of 13k20 = 3920 we may choose 2.5.
We now state a similar result for any m, generalizing Theorem 6.2 that only holds when
m ≥ 2n. We use a modification of Greedy Round-Robin. While m < 2n, the algorithm picks
any agent uniformly at random and gives her only her “best” item (phase 1). When the number
of available items becomes two times the number of active agents, the algorithm proceeds as
usual (phase 2). We note that while for m ≥ 2n Theorem 6.2 gives the stronger guarantee of
vi (M)
n for each agent i , here we can only have a guarantee of µi (n, M).
Theorem 6.3. Let N = [n], M = [m], and the vi j s be as in Theorem 6.2. Then, for any m and large
enough n, the Modified Greedy Round-Robin algorithm allocates to each agent i a set of items of
total value at least µi (n, M) with probability 1−o(1). The o(1) term is O(1/n) when m > 2n and
O(logn/n) when m ≤ 2n.
Proof. If m ≥ 2n then this is a corollary of Theorem 6.2. When m < 2n, then for any agent i we
have max j {vi j }≥µi (n, M). So the first agent that receives only her most valuable item has total
value at least µi (n, M). If Na , Ma are the sets of remaining agents and items respectively, after
several agents were assigned one item in phase 1 of the algorithm, then by Lemma 3.4, for any
agent i ∈Na , we have µi (|Na |, Ma)≥µi (n, M). If |Ma | < 2|Na | it is also true that max j∈Ma vi j ≥
µi (|Na |, Ma), so correctness of phase 1 follows by induction. If |Ma | = 2|Na |, then by Theorem
6.2 phase 2 guarantees that with high probability each agent i ∈ Na will receive a set of items
with total value at least 1|Na |vi (Ma)≥µi (|Na |, Ma)≥µi (n, M).
Remark 1. The implicit constants in the probability bounds of Theorems 6.2 and 6.3 depend
heavily on n and m, as well as on the point one uses to separate Yi and
1
n
∑m
j=1 vi j in the proof
of Theorem 6.2. Our analysis gives good bounds for the case 2n ≤ m < 3n without requiring
very large values for n (especially when κ(n) in the proof of Theorem 6.2 is not small). For
example, if m = 2.4n an appropriate adjustment of our bounds gives a o(1) term less than 1.7/n
for n ≥ 41. When we switch from the detailed analysis of the 2n ≤m < 3n case to the sloppier
general treatment for m ≥ 3n, there is definitely some loss, e.g., for m = 4n we get that the o(1)
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term is less than 130/n for n > 450. This is corrected relatively quickly as m grows, e.g., for
m = 13n the o(1) term can be made less than 8/n for n ≥ 59. One can significantly improve
the constants by breaking the interval kn ≤m < (k +1)n into smaller intervals (not unlike the
3n ≤m < 3.5n case).
Theorems 6.2 and 6.3 may leave the impression that n has to be large. Actually, there is no
reason why we cannot consider n fixed and let m grow. Following closely the proof of Theorem
6.2 for m ≥ 4n, we get the next corollary. Notice that now we can use E[Wn]≥ 0.7k andσ2Wn < k.
Corollary 6.4. Let N = [n], M = [m], and the vi j s be as in Theorem 6.2. Then, for fixed n and
large enough m, the Greedy Round-Robin algorithm allocates to each agent i a set of goods of
total value at least 1n
∑m
j=1 vi j with probability 1−O(1/m).
7 Conclusions
The most interesting open question is undoubtedly whether one can improve on the 2/3-appro-
ximation. Going beyond 2/3 seems to require a drastically different approach. One idea that
may deserve further exploration is to pick in each step of Algorithm 4, the best out of all pos-
sible matchings (and not just an arbitrary matching as is done in line 7 of the algorithm). This
is essentially what we exploit for the special case of n = 3 agents. However, for a larger number
of agents, this seems to result in a heavy case analysis without any visible benefits. In terms
of non-combinatorial techniques, we are not currently aware of any promising LP-based ap-
proach to the problem.
Even establishing better ratios for special cases could still provide new insights into the
problem. It would be interesting, for example, to see if we can have an improved ratio for
the special case studied in Bansal and Sviridenko [2006] for the Santa Claus problem. In this
case of additive functions, the value of a good j takes only two distinct values, 0 or v j . On the
other hand, obtaining negative results seems to be an even more challenging task, given our
probabilistic analysis and the results of related works. The negative results [Kurokawa et al.,
2016, Procaccia and Wang, 2014] require very elaborate constructions, which still do not yield
an inapproximability factor far away from 1. Apart from improving the approximation qual-
ity, exploring practical aspects of our algorithms is another direction, see e.g., Spliddit [2015].
Finally, we have not addressed here the issues of truthfulness and mechanism design, a stimu-
lating topic for future work, studied recently by [Amanatidis et al., 2016, 2017]. These works still
leave several open questions regarding the approximability that can be achieved under truth-
fulness (without payments) for more than two agents. It is also not clear if more positive results
can arise when payments are allowed. Similar mechanism design questions also remain open
for a related problem studied by Markakis and Psomas [2011].
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